Inside the Bounty Scandal
Inviato: 02/05/2014, 11:44
Ebbene si come promesso dopo essermi ciucciato 2 libri in lingua originale per un totale di 730 pagine sulle vicende del tanto vituperato Bounty Scandal, finalmente sono pronto per trattare l’argomento in modo completo e profondo, parlando di volta in volta delle singole vicende e delle numerose illazioni e falsità che l’Nfl e nello specifico Rodger Goodell ha dato in pasto ai Media nei mesi convulsi che hanno caratterizzato la off-season e la prima parte della stagione regolare nell’anno solare 2012
Come è inevitabile, e non ve ne do colpa, sulla vicenda girano un sacco di preconcetti basati su una conoscenza della vicenda limitata e probabilmente risalenti alle prime notizie trapelate nel momento in cui l’Nfl ha rilasciato le prime dichiarazioni (che poi nella maggior parte dei casi si riveleranno infondate e false). La cosa che ho scoperto , man mano che mi inoltravo nella lettura dei numerosi capitoli, è di quanto la mia conoscenza della vicenda fosse limitata(x non dire limitatissima) e tutto questo nonostante la mia “fede” saints. Non me ne vogliate ma immagino che il 90% di voi ne sappia ancor meno di quello che sapevo originariamente io.
Vi chiedo di iniziare, se volete farlo ovviamente, questa discussione con la mente aperta, lasciando fuori le rivalità e l’odio, ma soprattutto con lo scopo di capire veramente cosa è successo e di sfruttare il mazzo che mi sono fatto leggendo pagine e pagine in inglese, alcune delle quali mi hanno messo alla dura prova in fatto di comprensione.
In base al tempo disponibile affronterò e dettaglierò volta per volta, vicende, personaggi e fatti specifici in modo da dare una copertura completa e approfondita di tutto l’accaduto.
1° Parte: La conclusione della vicenda
Voglio cominciare il mio racconto dalla fine, giusto per chiarire un po’ di cose che dopo il clamore iniziale sono passate in secondo piano con il passare del tempo.
Prima di parlare nel dettaglio della conclusione della vicenda vorrei prima chiarire il significato di un paio di termini che più in la risulterà chiave per la comprensione di tutte le incomprensioni e cioè la differenza tra:
-Bounty Program: Programma basato sull’erogazione di premi in base ad azioni di gioco intenzionali e deliberatamente cercate che portano all’infortunio di un avversario e alla sua uscita dal campo.
-Pay for Perfomance Program: Programma basato sull’erogazione di premi in base a giocate importanti e decisive durante una partita. Nello specifico i premi potrebbero riguardare Intercetti, Fumbles Forced, Big Hit regolari, Tackles for loss ecc. ecc. Va chiarito che questi tipi di programmi sono considerati illegali secondo il regolamento Nfl perché sfuggono al controllo del Salary Cap, ma in realtà vengono tollerati in maniera abbastanza ampia perché comunque incidono in modo molto limitando in quanto il valore dei premi è abbastanza basso. Durante il corso del processo e dei vari appelli risulterà che la maggior parte dei team nfl ha in corso o usa un “Pay for Performance” program, ecco un estratto dell’appello finale di tagliabue
“History of Performance Pools in the NFL
The League has had prohibitions of pay-for-performance programs and non-contract
bonuses for many decades. Some of them (including provisions in the NFL Constitution and
Bylaws) have remained unchanged over these many years and have come to lack clarity. They
focus primarily on payments by clubs; use terms - - such as “blanket remuneration” - - that do
not appear to have any clear current meaning; and now apply to contractual terms and salary /
bonus levels that bear little or no relationship to terms prevailing when the prohibitions were
originally enacted. Until the early 1990s, many of these prohibitions applied to programs
involving both players and teams but were focused on team-sponsored or team-managed
programs and payments made by teams to players.
Beginning with the 1994 season, when the collectively-bargained salary cap first became
operative in the NFL, the preexisting prohibitions of pay-for-performance payments or bonuses
made by clubs were effectively superseded by the “cap circumvention” provisions of the new
CBA. This was clearly recognized in the CBA Appeals Panel Decision.
In the years since the establishment of the salary cap and related prohibitions on cap
circumvention, the League has focused its directives relative to pay-for-performance programs
on payments made by and among players to each other. In 2007 or prior, the League began
including in its League Policies for Players the “Bounty Rule,” which prohibits clubs offering or
paying non-contract “bonuses” to a player and “also prohibits players and any other club
employees from offering or accepting such a bonus.” (Emphasis added.)
These references to players paying “bonuses” may not necessarily always communicate
to players that the prohibition encompasses modest sums of money contributed to performance
pools, because “bonuses” in many player contracts often involve many thousands or hundreds of
thousands of dollars. Neither the League nor the NFLPA appears to have developed a fully
articulated, concrete set of guidelines or prohibitions related to performance pools that take into
account the current realities of signing bonuses, reporting bonuses, performance bonuses and
other incentive arrangements often included in NFL player contracts.
Although the four players signed a statement indicating they had read and received the
League Policies for Players prohibiting “bonuses” and many other things, these appeal hearings
suggest that many players had not read them, and they argue that the League Policies for Players
are not binding in any event under the CBA. In addition, the NFL in its policies sends a mixed
message by allowing “kangaroo courts” where players are fined for mental lapses and other onfield
mistakes but prohibiting any distributions to players via those courts. Most important, no
matter what the League rules and policies are or have been, if many teams in the League allow
pay-for-performance programs to operate in the locker room, as seems to be the case, and, in the
main, the League has tolerated this behavior without punishment of players, then many players
15
may not have a clear understanding that such behavior is prohibited or where the lines are
between permissible and impermissible conduct.
The record evidence now shows that the terms “pay-for-performance” program or “pool”
can refer to many different types of team or player arrangements relative to rewarding players for
performances in particular games or with respect to particular aspects of a game. Some of these
programs or pools appear to be viewed as relatively benign by NFL coaches and players, while
others appear to be sources of disagreement or even contention among coaches themselves and
among players at different positions or on different teams.
In the testimony before me, current NFL executive Troy Vincent, a former outstanding
player with the Philadelphia Eagles, confirmed that during his time with the Eagles the defensive
backs had created a performance pool that simply covered three types of plays - - interceptions,
fumble recoveries and touchdowns - - none of which rewarded the purposeful injury of an
opponent. Indeed, Vincent testified that the pool conducted within the Eagles in his career
covered both regular season games as well as team practices. Obviously, such a program cannot
reasonably be viewed as having been created or managed to injure players.
Other programs on other teams involving greater sums of money were discussed at the
appeals hearings. For example, Vincent’s former teammate, Reggie White, while an outstanding
player for the Green Bay Packers, can be seen on an ESPN video on Super Bowl Sunday in
January 1997 describing the payouts to players for big plays. When asked about White’s
description of the Packers’ program, Vincent confirmed that it was considerably broader in scope
and funding than any program with which he was familiar. The evidence before me - -
specifically, the video of the ESPN program - - contains a statement attributable to an NFL
spokesman, who reportedly (and evidently reliably) told ESPN:
What does the NFL have to say about this incentive program that
players insist is not a bounty. A league spokesman said the
Smash4Cash program is within the rules as long as players use
their own monies; the amounts are not exorbitant, and the
payments are not for illegal hits”
Specificata la differenza tra i 2 programmi veniamo a scoprire come si concluse il processo e le decioni prese durante l’ultimo appello condotto dal Sig. Tagliabue, ex commissioner dell Nfl e avvocato difensore dello stesso Goodell e dell Nfl.
Come sopra detto l’ultimo appello non fu condotto dallo stesso Goodell ma da Tagliabue.
Questo avvenne dopo numero pressioni portate dall’associazione dei giocatori, ma anche dal Giudice Hellen Berrigan della suprema corte in cui si contestava ripetutamente la figura non parziale di Goodell che fungeva sia da accusatore che da giudice. Certo Goodell non scelse una persona molto lontana da lui, scegliendo alla fine il suo avvocato ma cmq un passo avanti fu fatto.
L’appello e il processo in generale riguardava solo le pene inflitte ai giocatori, che erano difesi dal sindacato NFPLA(il sindaco dei giocatori Nfl) e che sottostavano al CBA, l’accordo collettivo tra giocatori e nfl.
Per i coach e il general manager, il discorso è ben diverso essendo sprovvisti sia di un contratto collettivo che di un sindacato. Una volta condannati frettolosamente da Goodell ad inizio 2012, Loomis, Payton, Joe Vitt e Greg Williams si trovarono con la spiacevole situazione di non poter fare assolutamente niente. Non potevano fare appello, non potevano impugnare la decisione del Nfl niente. Goodell aveva in mano letteralmente il proseguimento della carriera professionale soprattutto di Williams e Payton , che prima di riprendere il loro lavoro, dovevano attendere che l’onnipotente Commisioner decidesse la loro reintegrazione. Nello specifico Greg Williams fu squalificato a vita, ma nella squalifica era specificato che la decisione poteva essere rivista nel caso Williams avesse collaborato proattivamente nella vicenda(detto in parole chiari, se collabori e non ci ostacoli ti riammettiamo altrimenti sognati di ritrovarti nuovamente in una side line nfl).Ma di Williams delle incongruenze nelle varie dichiarazione e del cavallo di troia della vicenda con nome Mike Cerullo parleremo ampiamente più avanti.
Veniamo al dunque di questo primo capitolo: L’11 Dicembre 2012, dopo un dibattito durato quasi 1 anno, fu emesso il verdetto finale per quanto riguarda le squalifiche dei giocatori che erano coinvolti nel presunto bounty gate. Anche in questo caso affronterò il dettaglio successivamente e per il momento farò un sunto della decisione.
Nell ‘arringa finale Tagliabue eliminò la parola Bounty dal suo comunicato convertendola in Pay for performance e già dalle prime righe si capi che qualcosa era cambiato. Sparirono dal comunicato i nomi delle presunte vittime delle “taglie” Kurt Warner, Aaron Rodgers e Cam Newton e resistette solo quello di Brett Favre e più avanti vedremo il perché. Quello che Goodell aveva fatto credere per mesi, cioè della presenza di un ramificato programma Bounty durato 3 anno con svariati target, si ridusse in arringa finale in un “Pay for performance “ program con un solo sospetto di taglia verso appunto Favre
Inizialmente Goodell nella sua caccia alle streghe parlò di un coinvolgimento di 20-22 giocatori Saints su 26 nel bounty program. Dopo qualche mese il quadro si ridusse drasticamente passando da 22 a 4 e nello specifico vennero squalificati:
-Scott Fujita per 3 giornate(poi annullata)
Final Determination and Findings as to Discipline of Scott Fujita
The NFL contends that the factual basis for Fujita’s discipline is not in dispute - - Fujita
admits offering money to teammates for big plays such as sacks and interceptions and also
admits that he was aware of the Program, which he never questioned or took any steps to stop.
Given that the factual basis for Fujita’s discipline is undisputed, I affirm Commissioner
Goodell’s findings in that regard.
The League also contends that, in determining whether Fujita engaged in conduct
detrimental, it is of no importance that he claims never to have offered money for hits on
opponents such as cart-offs or knockouts. The League urges that merely offering rewards for big
plays - - in which Fujita engaged “while a respected leader of the Saints’ defense and role model
for other players” - - clearly violates the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.
I find the NFL’s contentions lacking in merit. In dealing with pay-for-performance pools
that appear comparable to Fujita’s pool, the League has emphasized club responsibility for
ensuring player compliance with League policies, and has disciplined clubs - - but not players - -
for non-compliance. For example, in separate instances involving the Green Bay Packers and
New England Patriots in 2007 and 2008, the League fined the clubs $25,000 or less, without
disciplining any player. Notably, the 2007 discipline letter to the Patriots stated that:
You have confirmed that a number of Patriots’ players
were in violation of this rule [prohibiting bonuses paid by players
to their teammates as a reward for game performance]. Fine
money assessed and collected by the players was distributed as
rewards to players for achieving an onfield incentive during a
game.
18
. . . While the Patriots’ players emphatically denied that
rewards were offered for targeting specific players or for taking
them out of the game, this issue underscores the importance of
prohibiting these types of bonuses; if an injury does occur, the
mere existence of a specific bonus for onfield performance against
a particular team invites unnecessary speculation that a player or
players may have been a target for overzealous defenders.
As you have acknowledged, it is the club’s responsibility to
inform its players of the parameters of the rule and monitor their
compliance.
Accordingly, the NFL’s decision to suspend a player here for participating in a program for
which the League typically fines a club certainly raises significant issues regarding inconsistent
treatment between players and teams.
Given that it is undisputed that Fujita did not participate in the Program including cartoffs
and knockouts, and that his participation in a “non-injury” pay-for-performance pool is
typically subject only to club discipline, I find that his actions here were not conduct detrimental
and vacate his suspension.
-Anthony Hargrove per 8 giornate(annullata)
Final Determination as to Anthony Hargrove
Commissioner Goodell charged Hargove with providing false information regarding a
bounty on Brett Favre or a “pay for performance bounty program,” which is presumably the
Program. Although I affirm Commissioner Goodell’s general finding that Hargrove contributed
to the obstruction of the investigation by providing denials as instructed by his coaches, a
number of factors complicate and mitigate the propriety of his remaining two-game suspension.
The context of previous NFL punishment for obstruction suggests that a seven-game
suspension is unprecedented and unwarranted here. In December 2010, the NFL fined Brett
Favre $50,000 - - but did not suspend him - - for obstruction of a League sexual harassment
investigation. Although not entirely comparable to the present matter, this illustrates the NFL’s
practice of fining, not suspending players, for serious violations of this type. There is no
evidence of a record of past suspensions based purely on obstructing a League investigation. In
my forty years of association with the NFL, I am aware of many instances of denials in
disciplinary proceedings that proved to be false, but I cannot recall any suspension for such
fabrication. This is not to mitigate in any way the severity of obstruction of an investigation with
substantial issues as unique as those involved here.
As a further complication, it is unclear exactly what NFL investigators asked Hargrove
regarding the Program or any other alleged program and, thus, unclear whether he lied about the
Program or the fact that it included cart-offs and knockouts. There is evidence in the appeals
record that NFL investigators may not have asked Hargrove whether the Saints employed any
particular program. The investigators focused on the alleged bounty placed on Brett Favre prior
to the NFC Championship game in January 2010, which was the impetus for questioning
Hargrove, who allegedly told a Vikings player of the Favre bounty. If Hargrove denied only the
existence of the alleged bounty on Favre, he is no more guilty of conduct detrimental than the
numerous Saints’ defensive team members from the 2009-2010 season who have provided sworn
statements or testimony to the same effect and who have not been suspended or otherwise
disciplined.
Finally, given the comprehensive, overt and ongoing nature of the obstruction by coaches
and their direct instructions to Hargrove to lie, combined with their control over his football
career, it is clear that Hargrove was under tremendous pressure to follow the chain of command
in order to keep his job.
I have concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate in these unique
circumstances that Anthony Hargrove’s alleged misconduct is deserving of a suspension. I
therefore vacate the suspension imposed on Hargrove.
-Will Smith per 4 giornate(annullate)
Will Smith’s participation in and contributions to the Program are largely undisputed, and
I therefore confirm Commissioner Goodell’s findings.
The Commissioner found that Smith’s assertion that rewards for cart-offs or knockouts in
the Program were offered only when an opposing player was disabled for a play or two because
he had the wind knocked out of him, and not if he sustained some other type of injury, was not
credible. I affirm Commissioner Goodell’s judgment that rewarding players for these categories
incentivizes injury of opposing players to a degree that is detrimental to the integrity of and
public confidence in the game.
Within the Saints’ defensive unit, Smith was one of approximately two dozen Saints’
defensive players who participated in the Program. Although Commissioner Goodell found
Smith’s role as a defensive leader to be a basis, at least in part, for singling Smith out for
discipline, this is inappropriate when most or all of the Saints’ defensive unit committed the
same or similar acts as those underpinning the discipline of Smith.
In addition, I am not aware of previous League discipline that similarly rested on whether
or not a player was a team leader. It may indeed be very constructive, in this and other contexts,
to expect team captains, other team leaders, or even players with years of seniority to meet
higher standards of responsibility for team conduct, and to take such status into account in
imposing fines and other discipline. This is a concept that would require in-depth discussion
with coaches and players. (I can foresee many different, legitimate points of view.) But, in any
event, this is not an issue for me to decide.
19
On the present record, selective prosecution of allegations of misconduct and
enforcement of discipline relative to Smith cannot be sustained. Whatever the reason for such
selective enforcement, it does not satisfy basic requirements for consistent treatment of playeremployees
similarly situated. Therefore, I vacate the suspension of Will Smith.
Come è inevitabile, e non ve ne do colpa, sulla vicenda girano un sacco di preconcetti basati su una conoscenza della vicenda limitata e probabilmente risalenti alle prime notizie trapelate nel momento in cui l’Nfl ha rilasciato le prime dichiarazioni (che poi nella maggior parte dei casi si riveleranno infondate e false). La cosa che ho scoperto , man mano che mi inoltravo nella lettura dei numerosi capitoli, è di quanto la mia conoscenza della vicenda fosse limitata(x non dire limitatissima) e tutto questo nonostante la mia “fede” saints. Non me ne vogliate ma immagino che il 90% di voi ne sappia ancor meno di quello che sapevo originariamente io.
Vi chiedo di iniziare, se volete farlo ovviamente, questa discussione con la mente aperta, lasciando fuori le rivalità e l’odio, ma soprattutto con lo scopo di capire veramente cosa è successo e di sfruttare il mazzo che mi sono fatto leggendo pagine e pagine in inglese, alcune delle quali mi hanno messo alla dura prova in fatto di comprensione.
In base al tempo disponibile affronterò e dettaglierò volta per volta, vicende, personaggi e fatti specifici in modo da dare una copertura completa e approfondita di tutto l’accaduto.
1° Parte: La conclusione della vicenda
Voglio cominciare il mio racconto dalla fine, giusto per chiarire un po’ di cose che dopo il clamore iniziale sono passate in secondo piano con il passare del tempo.
Prima di parlare nel dettaglio della conclusione della vicenda vorrei prima chiarire il significato di un paio di termini che più in la risulterà chiave per la comprensione di tutte le incomprensioni e cioè la differenza tra:
-Bounty Program: Programma basato sull’erogazione di premi in base ad azioni di gioco intenzionali e deliberatamente cercate che portano all’infortunio di un avversario e alla sua uscita dal campo.
-Pay for Perfomance Program: Programma basato sull’erogazione di premi in base a giocate importanti e decisive durante una partita. Nello specifico i premi potrebbero riguardare Intercetti, Fumbles Forced, Big Hit regolari, Tackles for loss ecc. ecc. Va chiarito che questi tipi di programmi sono considerati illegali secondo il regolamento Nfl perché sfuggono al controllo del Salary Cap, ma in realtà vengono tollerati in maniera abbastanza ampia perché comunque incidono in modo molto limitando in quanto il valore dei premi è abbastanza basso. Durante il corso del processo e dei vari appelli risulterà che la maggior parte dei team nfl ha in corso o usa un “Pay for Performance” program, ecco un estratto dell’appello finale di tagliabue
“History of Performance Pools in the NFL
The League has had prohibitions of pay-for-performance programs and non-contract
bonuses for many decades. Some of them (including provisions in the NFL Constitution and
Bylaws) have remained unchanged over these many years and have come to lack clarity. They
focus primarily on payments by clubs; use terms - - such as “blanket remuneration” - - that do
not appear to have any clear current meaning; and now apply to contractual terms and salary /
bonus levels that bear little or no relationship to terms prevailing when the prohibitions were
originally enacted. Until the early 1990s, many of these prohibitions applied to programs
involving both players and teams but were focused on team-sponsored or team-managed
programs and payments made by teams to players.
Beginning with the 1994 season, when the collectively-bargained salary cap first became
operative in the NFL, the preexisting prohibitions of pay-for-performance payments or bonuses
made by clubs were effectively superseded by the “cap circumvention” provisions of the new
CBA. This was clearly recognized in the CBA Appeals Panel Decision.
In the years since the establishment of the salary cap and related prohibitions on cap
circumvention, the League has focused its directives relative to pay-for-performance programs
on payments made by and among players to each other. In 2007 or prior, the League began
including in its League Policies for Players the “Bounty Rule,” which prohibits clubs offering or
paying non-contract “bonuses” to a player and “also prohibits players and any other club
employees from offering or accepting such a bonus.” (Emphasis added.)
These references to players paying “bonuses” may not necessarily always communicate
to players that the prohibition encompasses modest sums of money contributed to performance
pools, because “bonuses” in many player contracts often involve many thousands or hundreds of
thousands of dollars. Neither the League nor the NFLPA appears to have developed a fully
articulated, concrete set of guidelines or prohibitions related to performance pools that take into
account the current realities of signing bonuses, reporting bonuses, performance bonuses and
other incentive arrangements often included in NFL player contracts.
Although the four players signed a statement indicating they had read and received the
League Policies for Players prohibiting “bonuses” and many other things, these appeal hearings
suggest that many players had not read them, and they argue that the League Policies for Players
are not binding in any event under the CBA. In addition, the NFL in its policies sends a mixed
message by allowing “kangaroo courts” where players are fined for mental lapses and other onfield
mistakes but prohibiting any distributions to players via those courts. Most important, no
matter what the League rules and policies are or have been, if many teams in the League allow
pay-for-performance programs to operate in the locker room, as seems to be the case, and, in the
main, the League has tolerated this behavior without punishment of players, then many players
15
may not have a clear understanding that such behavior is prohibited or where the lines are
between permissible and impermissible conduct.
The record evidence now shows that the terms “pay-for-performance” program or “pool”
can refer to many different types of team or player arrangements relative to rewarding players for
performances in particular games or with respect to particular aspects of a game. Some of these
programs or pools appear to be viewed as relatively benign by NFL coaches and players, while
others appear to be sources of disagreement or even contention among coaches themselves and
among players at different positions or on different teams.
In the testimony before me, current NFL executive Troy Vincent, a former outstanding
player with the Philadelphia Eagles, confirmed that during his time with the Eagles the defensive
backs had created a performance pool that simply covered three types of plays - - interceptions,
fumble recoveries and touchdowns - - none of which rewarded the purposeful injury of an
opponent. Indeed, Vincent testified that the pool conducted within the Eagles in his career
covered both regular season games as well as team practices. Obviously, such a program cannot
reasonably be viewed as having been created or managed to injure players.
Other programs on other teams involving greater sums of money were discussed at the
appeals hearings. For example, Vincent’s former teammate, Reggie White, while an outstanding
player for the Green Bay Packers, can be seen on an ESPN video on Super Bowl Sunday in
January 1997 describing the payouts to players for big plays. When asked about White’s
description of the Packers’ program, Vincent confirmed that it was considerably broader in scope
and funding than any program with which he was familiar. The evidence before me - -
specifically, the video of the ESPN program - - contains a statement attributable to an NFL
spokesman, who reportedly (and evidently reliably) told ESPN:
What does the NFL have to say about this incentive program that
players insist is not a bounty. A league spokesman said the
Smash4Cash program is within the rules as long as players use
their own monies; the amounts are not exorbitant, and the
payments are not for illegal hits”
Specificata la differenza tra i 2 programmi veniamo a scoprire come si concluse il processo e le decioni prese durante l’ultimo appello condotto dal Sig. Tagliabue, ex commissioner dell Nfl e avvocato difensore dello stesso Goodell e dell Nfl.
Come sopra detto l’ultimo appello non fu condotto dallo stesso Goodell ma da Tagliabue.
Questo avvenne dopo numero pressioni portate dall’associazione dei giocatori, ma anche dal Giudice Hellen Berrigan della suprema corte in cui si contestava ripetutamente la figura non parziale di Goodell che fungeva sia da accusatore che da giudice. Certo Goodell non scelse una persona molto lontana da lui, scegliendo alla fine il suo avvocato ma cmq un passo avanti fu fatto.
L’appello e il processo in generale riguardava solo le pene inflitte ai giocatori, che erano difesi dal sindacato NFPLA(il sindaco dei giocatori Nfl) e che sottostavano al CBA, l’accordo collettivo tra giocatori e nfl.
Per i coach e il general manager, il discorso è ben diverso essendo sprovvisti sia di un contratto collettivo che di un sindacato. Una volta condannati frettolosamente da Goodell ad inizio 2012, Loomis, Payton, Joe Vitt e Greg Williams si trovarono con la spiacevole situazione di non poter fare assolutamente niente. Non potevano fare appello, non potevano impugnare la decisione del Nfl niente. Goodell aveva in mano letteralmente il proseguimento della carriera professionale soprattutto di Williams e Payton , che prima di riprendere il loro lavoro, dovevano attendere che l’onnipotente Commisioner decidesse la loro reintegrazione. Nello specifico Greg Williams fu squalificato a vita, ma nella squalifica era specificato che la decisione poteva essere rivista nel caso Williams avesse collaborato proattivamente nella vicenda(detto in parole chiari, se collabori e non ci ostacoli ti riammettiamo altrimenti sognati di ritrovarti nuovamente in una side line nfl).Ma di Williams delle incongruenze nelle varie dichiarazione e del cavallo di troia della vicenda con nome Mike Cerullo parleremo ampiamente più avanti.
Veniamo al dunque di questo primo capitolo: L’11 Dicembre 2012, dopo un dibattito durato quasi 1 anno, fu emesso il verdetto finale per quanto riguarda le squalifiche dei giocatori che erano coinvolti nel presunto bounty gate. Anche in questo caso affronterò il dettaglio successivamente e per il momento farò un sunto della decisione.
Nell ‘arringa finale Tagliabue eliminò la parola Bounty dal suo comunicato convertendola in Pay for performance e già dalle prime righe si capi che qualcosa era cambiato. Sparirono dal comunicato i nomi delle presunte vittime delle “taglie” Kurt Warner, Aaron Rodgers e Cam Newton e resistette solo quello di Brett Favre e più avanti vedremo il perché. Quello che Goodell aveva fatto credere per mesi, cioè della presenza di un ramificato programma Bounty durato 3 anno con svariati target, si ridusse in arringa finale in un “Pay for performance “ program con un solo sospetto di taglia verso appunto Favre
Inizialmente Goodell nella sua caccia alle streghe parlò di un coinvolgimento di 20-22 giocatori Saints su 26 nel bounty program. Dopo qualche mese il quadro si ridusse drasticamente passando da 22 a 4 e nello specifico vennero squalificati:
-Scott Fujita per 3 giornate(poi annullata)
Final Determination and Findings as to Discipline of Scott Fujita
The NFL contends that the factual basis for Fujita’s discipline is not in dispute - - Fujita
admits offering money to teammates for big plays such as sacks and interceptions and also
admits that he was aware of the Program, which he never questioned or took any steps to stop.
Given that the factual basis for Fujita’s discipline is undisputed, I affirm Commissioner
Goodell’s findings in that regard.
The League also contends that, in determining whether Fujita engaged in conduct
detrimental, it is of no importance that he claims never to have offered money for hits on
opponents such as cart-offs or knockouts. The League urges that merely offering rewards for big
plays - - in which Fujita engaged “while a respected leader of the Saints’ defense and role model
for other players” - - clearly violates the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.
I find the NFL’s contentions lacking in merit. In dealing with pay-for-performance pools
that appear comparable to Fujita’s pool, the League has emphasized club responsibility for
ensuring player compliance with League policies, and has disciplined clubs - - but not players - -
for non-compliance. For example, in separate instances involving the Green Bay Packers and
New England Patriots in 2007 and 2008, the League fined the clubs $25,000 or less, without
disciplining any player. Notably, the 2007 discipline letter to the Patriots stated that:
You have confirmed that a number of Patriots’ players
were in violation of this rule [prohibiting bonuses paid by players
to their teammates as a reward for game performance]. Fine
money assessed and collected by the players was distributed as
rewards to players for achieving an onfield incentive during a
game.
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. . . While the Patriots’ players emphatically denied that
rewards were offered for targeting specific players or for taking
them out of the game, this issue underscores the importance of
prohibiting these types of bonuses; if an injury does occur, the
mere existence of a specific bonus for onfield performance against
a particular team invites unnecessary speculation that a player or
players may have been a target for overzealous defenders.
As you have acknowledged, it is the club’s responsibility to
inform its players of the parameters of the rule and monitor their
compliance.
Accordingly, the NFL’s decision to suspend a player here for participating in a program for
which the League typically fines a club certainly raises significant issues regarding inconsistent
treatment between players and teams.
Given that it is undisputed that Fujita did not participate in the Program including cartoffs
and knockouts, and that his participation in a “non-injury” pay-for-performance pool is
typically subject only to club discipline, I find that his actions here were not conduct detrimental
and vacate his suspension.
-Anthony Hargrove per 8 giornate(annullata)
Final Determination as to Anthony Hargrove
Commissioner Goodell charged Hargove with providing false information regarding a
bounty on Brett Favre or a “pay for performance bounty program,” which is presumably the
Program. Although I affirm Commissioner Goodell’s general finding that Hargrove contributed
to the obstruction of the investigation by providing denials as instructed by his coaches, a
number of factors complicate and mitigate the propriety of his remaining two-game suspension.
The context of previous NFL punishment for obstruction suggests that a seven-game
suspension is unprecedented and unwarranted here. In December 2010, the NFL fined Brett
Favre $50,000 - - but did not suspend him - - for obstruction of a League sexual harassment
investigation. Although not entirely comparable to the present matter, this illustrates the NFL’s
practice of fining, not suspending players, for serious violations of this type. There is no
evidence of a record of past suspensions based purely on obstructing a League investigation. In
my forty years of association with the NFL, I am aware of many instances of denials in
disciplinary proceedings that proved to be false, but I cannot recall any suspension for such
fabrication. This is not to mitigate in any way the severity of obstruction of an investigation with
substantial issues as unique as those involved here.
As a further complication, it is unclear exactly what NFL investigators asked Hargrove
regarding the Program or any other alleged program and, thus, unclear whether he lied about the
Program or the fact that it included cart-offs and knockouts. There is evidence in the appeals
record that NFL investigators may not have asked Hargrove whether the Saints employed any
particular program. The investigators focused on the alleged bounty placed on Brett Favre prior
to the NFC Championship game in January 2010, which was the impetus for questioning
Hargrove, who allegedly told a Vikings player of the Favre bounty. If Hargrove denied only the
existence of the alleged bounty on Favre, he is no more guilty of conduct detrimental than the
numerous Saints’ defensive team members from the 2009-2010 season who have provided sworn
statements or testimony to the same effect and who have not been suspended or otherwise
disciplined.
Finally, given the comprehensive, overt and ongoing nature of the obstruction by coaches
and their direct instructions to Hargrove to lie, combined with their control over his football
career, it is clear that Hargrove was under tremendous pressure to follow the chain of command
in order to keep his job.
I have concluded that there is not sufficient evidence to demonstrate in these unique
circumstances that Anthony Hargrove’s alleged misconduct is deserving of a suspension. I
therefore vacate the suspension imposed on Hargrove.
-Will Smith per 4 giornate(annullate)
Will Smith’s participation in and contributions to the Program are largely undisputed, and
I therefore confirm Commissioner Goodell’s findings.
The Commissioner found that Smith’s assertion that rewards for cart-offs or knockouts in
the Program were offered only when an opposing player was disabled for a play or two because
he had the wind knocked out of him, and not if he sustained some other type of injury, was not
credible. I affirm Commissioner Goodell’s judgment that rewarding players for these categories
incentivizes injury of opposing players to a degree that is detrimental to the integrity of and
public confidence in the game.
Within the Saints’ defensive unit, Smith was one of approximately two dozen Saints’
defensive players who participated in the Program. Although Commissioner Goodell found
Smith’s role as a defensive leader to be a basis, at least in part, for singling Smith out for
discipline, this is inappropriate when most or all of the Saints’ defensive unit committed the
same or similar acts as those underpinning the discipline of Smith.
In addition, I am not aware of previous League discipline that similarly rested on whether
or not a player was a team leader. It may indeed be very constructive, in this and other contexts,
to expect team captains, other team leaders, or even players with years of seniority to meet
higher standards of responsibility for team conduct, and to take such status into account in
imposing fines and other discipline. This is a concept that would require in-depth discussion
with coaches and players. (I can foresee many different, legitimate points of view.) But, in any
event, this is not an issue for me to decide.
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On the present record, selective prosecution of allegations of misconduct and
enforcement of discipline relative to Smith cannot be sustained. Whatever the reason for such
selective enforcement, it does not satisfy basic requirements for consistent treatment of playeremployees
similarly situated. Therefore, I vacate the suspension of Will Smith.